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Non-delegable duty after Tiong Aik 
By Low Kee Yang and Ian Mah Hao Ran 
 




It is established law that, outside of vicarious liability, a person who has a duty of care may 
delegate his task along with the duty (or responsibility) to another person and, so long as he 
appoints his representative with care, he is not be liable for his representative’s negligence. 
However, there are exceptions to this general principle; in some instances, the duty is said to be 
non-delegable. The subject of non-delegable duty has troubled courts for some time and attempts 
to construct a unifying theory have not met with much success, certainly not until the UK 
Supreme Court decision in Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association.1 There, Lord 
Sumption JSC sought to rationalise the piecemeal development of the law and provided a 
reasonably coherent and robust framework. 
In MCST No 3322 v Tiong Aik Construction Pte Ltd (“Tiong Aik”) 2, Singapore’s apex court 
had the opportunity to deliberate upon this difficult subject and in particular the recent Woodland 
framework. This case comment examines the decision, the law emanating from it and the 
lingering difficulties and challenges. 
 
High Court Decision 
In the High Court,3 the Management Corporation (“MCST”) of The Seaview condominium sued 
the Developer, the Main Contractor, the Architect and the Mechanical and Electrical Engineer 
for certain defects or deficiencies, namely incomplete fibre optic cabling, the nuisance of small 
leaves falling into the pool and foul smell from the plumbing and sanitary system. 
The High Court held that the independent contractor defence availed.4 It found that: 
 the Main Contractor and the Architect were independent contractors of the Developer; 
 the Main Contractor’s 21 sub-contractors were independent contractors, and 
 two companies Squire Mech and Sitectomix were independent contractors of the 
Architect. 
The Court also found that the defendants had carried out the relevant due diligence in appointing 
the independent contractors. It also held that the defendants were not under a non-delegable duty. 
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The MCST appealed, but only as against the Main Contractor and the Architect. In the course of 
the appellate proceedings, the focus was narrowed down to whether the Main Contractor and the 
Architect owed the MCST non-delegable duties under common law to build and design The 
Seaview with reasonable care. 
Court of Appeal Decision and Reasoning 
The Court of Appeal decided that the respondents did not owe the MCST non-delegable duties. 
In a nutshell, the Court found that the case did not come within any of the established categories 
of non-delegable duties, and neither were the Woodland requirements satisfied. The court also 
saw no reason, on the factual scenario, to create a new category of non-delegable duty. 
Justice Chao Hick Tin, delivering the judgment of the Court,5 began his analysis of non-
delegable duty with a reminder that tort liability is fundamentally fault-based and that “a person 
is generally only held liable for his own carelessness, and not the carelessness of others”.6 He 
also noted how vicarious liability stood as a “true exception” to this principle. He further noted7 
that there may be non-delegable duty where one has a personal duty and observed that this duty 
to ensure that care is taken is not equivalent to strict liability. Justice Chao rounded off his 
prelude with the oft-repeated truism that vicarious liability involves secondary liability whilst 
non-delegable duty involves primary liability, and the two doctrines are separate and distinct. 
(The honourable Judge proceeded to consider the matter of statutory non-delegable duty, an issue 
the appellant’s counsel had opted not to pursue.)8 
Moving on, Justice Chao catalogued the discrete instances9 of non-delegable duty at common 
law, namely employee safety, hospitals, schools and extra-hazardous operations, and cautioned 
that it is for Singapore courts to decide in each of these instances whether to follow the lead of 
other jurisdictions. 
On the matter of a unifying theory for non-delegable duty, his honour referred to various theories 
or concepts canvassed in various jurisdictions, including vulnerability, dependence, control and 
assumption of responsibility before arriving at the landmark Woodland decision and Lord 
Sumption’s five defining features of non-delegable duties, namely: 
a. the claimant is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant 
against risk of injury; 
b. there is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant which places 
the claimant in the custody, care or charge of the defendant and from this relationship 
(which characteristically involves control) the defendant has assumed a positive duty to 
protect the defendant from harm; 
c. the claimant has no control over how the defendant chooses to perform those obligations; 
d. the defendant delegated to a third party an integral part of the positive duty; and 




Justice Chao then remarked that Lord Sumption’s framework was “a good starting point” for the 
development of non-delegable duties in Singapore and declared that henceforth a claimant must 
“minimally” show that his case either falls within the established categories of non-delegable 
duty or possesses all of the five Woodland features. After these “threshold” requirements are 
satisfied, the Court has still to decide whether it is fair and reasonable to impose a non-delegable 
duty in the circumstances and take into account policy considerations. 
Finally, his honour reiterated10 that non-delegable duties are exceptional and the development of 
new instances of non-delegable duty should be done analogically and cautiously, bearing in mind 
Gleeson CJ’s observation in Leichhardt11 that non-delegable duties are in many instances duties 
which the duty-bearer cannot fulfil. 
Applying the Woodland framework to the case before him, Justice Chao was of the view that 
several of the key features were not satisfied. 
In the first place, the MCST was not in any sense in the “custody, care and charge” of the 
respondents. Elaborating on the aspect of control, his honour remarked12 that ‘[t]he most that 
could be said was that the Main Contractor and/or the Architect undertook their roles in the 
construction project reasonably foreseeing that any negligence by it or its sub-contractors may 
cause harm to the MCST. This falls far short of the type of custodial relationships necessary to 
give rise to non-delegable duties.’ 
Secondly, Justice Chao found that the MCST was not especially vulnerable or dependent on the 
protection of the respondents against the risk of injury13. He noted14 that the MCST had 
alternative avenues of recourse, including a breach of contract claim against the Developer and a 
claim under contractual warranties against the Main Contractor. 
The third reason is slightly complicated. Essentially, the argument15 is that if the Developer 
wanted to sue the Main Contractor or the Architect in tort, its claim would fail since the 
commercial understanding was that the Developer should proceed against the relevant sub-
contractor under the warranty certificates issued by the latter. So, according to Justice Chao, if 
the Developer could not successfully sue the Main Contractor or the Architect in tort, then 
neither could MCST, the ‘successor’ of the Developer. 
Justice Chao then considered whether, as a matter of policy, the court should develop a new 
category of non-delegable duty in relation to construction professionals. The appellant had put 
forward several policy reasons but his honour found none of them compelling. The first – 
industry practice and expectations that the builder and/or the architect would take responsibility 
for all building defects – his honour thought was unsubstantiated. His honour found the second 
reason – simplifying the legal process for the MCST16 – more compelling but remarked17 that 
“this was part and parcel of any litigation and was an ordinary risk endemic in any investment, 
including the purchase of a property”. Finally,18 Chao JA thought the appellant’s argument that 
there may be insufficient proximity between the MCST and the negligent sub-contractors was 
“completely unfounded”.19 He then made the concluding remark20 that given the increasing 
specialisation in the construction industry, which necessitated sub-contracting, it would be 
“excessively onerous” to impose non-delegable duty. 
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Hence, the Court found no non-delegable duty on the respondents’ part. 
Comments and Thoughts 
As always, an observer would have at least two concerns – the law (and its development) and 
justice on the facts. In this case, the two are intertwined. 
As regards the law, the Court of Appeal’s position and stance is broadly in accord with what is 
taking place in other jurisdictions. Post-Tiong Aik, the Singapore position on non-delegable duty 
appears to be as follows: 
a. In general, a person who has a duty of care can delegate that duty, and so long as he 
appoints his representative with care, he will not be liable even if the representative was 
negligent; 
b. However, where the representative is an employee, he may be liable under the doctrine of 
vicarious liability; 
c. In contrast, if the representative is an independent contractor, he will generally not be 
liable. Exceptionally, he may have a non-delegable duty. The exceptions are: 
i. where the case falls within one of the established instances of non-delegable duty 
(such as schools or hospitals); 
ii. where all the Woodland features are present and where it is just and reasonable, 
taking into account policy considerations, to impose a non-delegable duty; 
iii. where the defendant is under a personal duty; and 
iv. in new scenarios, where the Courts, proceeding cautiously and by clear analogy to 
an existing category of non-delegable duty, decide to impose such a duty where 
the case is very compelling;21 
d. Tort law is fault-based and a person who carefully delegates to an independent contractor 
has no fault and hence should not be liable for the contractor’s negligence; 
e. There is no exclusionary rule, as regards non-delegable duty, in respect of pure economic 
loss22; and 
f. There is, in general,23 no non-delegable duty in respect of construction professionals. 
To be sure, the Court of Appeal in Tiong Aik has provided a very good excursus of the law and 
has clearly stated the Singapore position on the subject. But whether the current law24 is fully 
rational and just is another matter and there is more than meets the eye. In the following 
paragraphs, the writers set forth the essence of the various doubts and challenges in this 
controversial area. 
In the first place, if one were to examine the matter closely, it is far from certain that the default 
position in law should be that a duty of care is, in general, delegable. If I ask someone to perform 
a task which is essentially mine, it seems logical and sensible that vis-à-vis the person to whom I 
owe the duty, I am responsible for the task being performed with care. The position is quite 
different if the beneficiary of the duty knows and expects that I am so delegating. The common 
law could just as well have developed along the line that a duty of care is, in general, non-
delegable and that only exceptionally (such as where the defendant lacked the expertise or where 
the claimant had agreed to the delegation) can the duty be delegated. 
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Related to this is the uncomfortable fact that vicarious liability looks very similar25 to non-
delegable duty despite the strenuous efforts to make supposedly vital distinctions between the 
two. The reality is that both vicarious liability and non-delegable duty are ways by which the law 
imputes liability to the defendant. It appears simplistic, particularly in this current business 
environment of increased outsourcing, to say that a defendant is liable if he engages an employee 
but not if he engages an independent contractor. Furthermore, the difference between an 
employee and an independent contractor is, sometimes, just a fine line. 
Another difficult piece of the jigsaw is that where the defendant engages an independent 
contractor, apart from the duty to act with care in appointing or selecting the contractor, 
theoretically, there may be, depending on the circumstances, a duty to supervise26 the contractor. 
But clear authority in support of a principle of a duty to supervise is remarkably hard to find, as 
witness the statement of Markesinis & Deakins27 that “there may even be some scattered dicta in 
our case law supporting, in some instances, primary duties of supervision.” As a simple example, 
suppose shortly after the contractor commencing work, the defendant learns that the contractor 
not so competent or not so careful. Surely, in such a circumstance, there is a primary duty, on the 
defendant’s part, to supervise the contractor. It is observed that the term “supervise” made a brief 
appearance in the penultimate paragraph of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Tiong Aik. In the 
writers’ view, if the law on supervision were sufficiently robust, then the worries over the 
potential injustice of delegability would be much reduced. 
Yet another difficulty is how non-delegability meshes with ideas of agency and authority. Take, 
for example, the following statement from Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency: 
A principal is liable for the loss or injury caused by the tort of his agent, whether or not his agent, 
whether or not his servant, and if not his servant, whether or not an independent contractor … 
(a) if the wrong was specifically instigated, authorised or ratified by the principal. (emphasis 
added) 
The further question is how to draw the line between authorisation and the absence of 
authorisation. In this regard, it is noted that in the High Court in Tiong Aik, the judge 
commented28 that there was no evidence that the Architect “condoned” the contractor’s negligent 
acts. The point here is that agency jurisprudence can be and, in appropriate situations, should be 
resorted to in order to mitigate the harshness of the general rule of delegability. 
Next, the issue of policy considerations and what is fair and reasonable. On this subject, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that it would be excessively burdensome to impose non-delegable 
duties on the Main Contractor and the Architect. But there are other perspectives. Tort law, as CJ 
Chan reminded in Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific 
Breweries (Singapore) Pte,29 emphasises victim compensation. Take the scenario of the 
purchaser of an apartment in a condominium project. His primary concerns include the location, 
the pricing and the developer. He typically has little or no knowledge of or interest in who the 
other participants of the development are. He is attended to by a sales staff (whom he perceives 
to be a representative or employee of the Developer) at the showroom, and who assures him on 
all his queries about fittings, facilities and all other matters. He proceeds to purchase the 
apartment. Subsequently, when defects are discovered and he makes a claim in negligence 
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against the Developer, the Developer answers him with a simple defence of delegation and a 
direction to seek out the contractors and sub-contractors. 
Consider another scenario, which is commonplace. An owner of an apartment desires to carry 
out renovations and engages a renovation contractor. They discuss the various aspects, such as 
structural changes, electrical wiring, tiling and painting and agree on price and completion date, 
amongst other things. The reality is that for some of the aspects the contractor uses his own 
employees and on others he hires an independent contractor. However, in the event that any 
aspect turns out unsatisfactory, the owner looks to the (main) contractor, who is expected to 
remedy or compensate. It would be quite ludicrous if when faced with the owner’s claim, 
whether in tort or in contract, the contractor could simply reply: “Oh, for each of these alleged 
defects, you have to pursue the sub-contractors and here is the list.” 
Does the legal position mesh with the reality and the legitimate expectations of purchasers? Is it 
fair and reasonable? As Lady Hale reminded in Woodland, the law must make sense to the 
ordinary person and not perplex the man on the underground30. An ordinary home owner would 
find it perplexing and illogical that he must hunt down the specific sub-contractor. The writers 
submit that imposing a non-delegable duty on the Developer, the Main Contractor or the 
Architect would not impose an excessive burden on them. The commercial reality is that they 
can easily obtain indemnities and other security from parties to whom they delegate their tasks. 
And it is unreasonable that the purchasers, through their proxy the MCST, have to seek out the 
sub-contractors and risk the prospect of these sub-contractors being unwilling or unable to pay. 
In the event the sub-contractor fails to pay, it is a weak reply to say that this was “an ordinary 
risk endemic in any investment”.31 
One rationale of vicarious liability is that employers have the financial capability to compensate 
the victim as compared to their employees.32 Similarly for non-delegable duties, could it not be 
said that the victim should not be left without recourse and should be able to sue the party who 
has benefitted from the independent contractor’s action? In this regard, one should note the point 
made by Lady Hale in Woodland, that arguments such as ability to pay – as an objection against 
non-delegable duty – “scarcely apply in today’s world where large organisations may well 
outsource their responsibilities to much poorer and un- or under-insured contractors”. 
Also, it is submitted, the fact that a victim may have a contractual claim is not itself sufficient 
reason to deny him an alternative claim in tort. 
A final point – Justice Chao remarked33 that the position of the MCST should not be any better 
than the Developer as after all, they are the successor of the Developer. It is noted that the 
developer assists in forming the first MCST. However, it would then be subsequently handed 
over to the owners upon conclusion of the first annual general meeting. Thus, it would be 
artificial to regard the eventual MCST as the successor of the Developer and deny compensation 
on that ground. 
Thus, for a variety of reasons, the legal framework of non-delegable duty in general and its 





The Court of Appeal has provided clarity on the controversial subject of non-delegable duty. In 
so doing it has reaffirmed the conventional position that a duty of care is, in general, delegable 
and that non-delegable duty is exceptional and should not be imposed unless there are very 
compelling reasons to do so. More specifically, it has endorsed the Woodland criteria as 
threshold requirements for the ascertainment of such a duty and stipulated the further need to 
consider whether it is just and reasonable, taking into account policy matters. The court also 
declined to create a new category of non-delegable duty for construction professionals. 
As explained above, while the Tiong Aik decision is within the realms of precedent and 
convention, there are difficult questions as to whether the law on non-delegable duty is truly just 
or justifiable. It would not surprise a hypothetical purchaser or the man in the street finds the 
current law perplexing. 
Postscript: 
In the recent SCA decision Ng Huat Seng v Munib Mohammad Madni [2017] SGCA 58 
(judgment issued on 26 September 2017), the subject of non-delegable duty was touched upon. 
Essentially, the Court endorsed Woodland and much of what was said in Tiong Aik. As regards 
the specific category of ultra-hazardous acts, it favoured the Biffa Waste approach 
(“exceptionally dangerous whatever the precautions are taken”) over the Honeywill approach 
(“dangerous operation in its intrinsic nature”). Menon CJ delivered the judgment. 
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